Innovation

Many complicated, proprietary systems attract a community of underground innovators who explore and alter them -- and not always in ways that manufacturers appreciate. These individuals have little regard for the business models that companies have carefully devised to profit from those systems. Instead, they are driven by utility, curiosity and occasionally even anger, bypassing technical and legal safeguards in their drive to explore. Called by different names -- hackers, phreakers, crackers and modders, among them -- these underground innovators have complex and often antagonistic relationships with the companies whose products they modify. Indeed, in many cases the underground innovation triggers a war between the community and the company. But if handled properly, it also can lead to cooperation between the two parties, potentially resulting in new business models and novel products. To achieve that, though, companies first need to understand how underground communities operate. Underground groups typically contain two distinct classes: elites and kiddies. "Elite" is a term reserved for those who truly innovate -- the wizards who understand the inner workings of a proprietary system and are able to make it do things never intended by its developers. "Kiddie" is short for "script kiddie," signifying someone who does not truly understand a system but merely uses tools created by the elites to exploit the system in some way. Most companies make the mistake of treating elites and kiddies the same way, often alienating those who might make positive contributions. A more effective approach is to nurture the constructive elites, rewarding and even supplying them with tools to encourage their efforts, all while deploying more aggressive means to thwart the destructive kiddies.

Most agree that innovation ensures superior performance, but there is less agreement on which innovation strategy or strategies best sustain that performance over time -- that is, which lead to resilience. The authors seek to answer that question by analyzing a set of global companies that have successfully adapted to diverse and turbulent changes over a period of two decades, as evidenced by their book value per share, return on assets and sales growth. Among those that sustained superior performance are multinationals such as pharmaceutical, coating and chemical manufacturer Akzo Nobel, electronics company Philips, energy and petrochemical company Shell, consumer goods manufacturer Unilever, life-science products and chemicals manufacturer DSM, multimedia publisher Wolters Kluwers, information and media provider VNU, investment and fund management group Robeco and brewing company Heineken. The research shows that resilient companies continually orchestrate a dynamic balance of four innovation strategies: knowledge management, exploration (internal research and development), cooperation (acquisitions, alliances and other relationships) and entrepreneurship. The authors conclude that focusing on one innovation strategy to the exclusion of others may produce innovation, but it will not lead to resilience. Pursuing several different innovation strategies simultaneously maximizes a company's chances of successful adaptation. Investments in innovation, they say, should not be driven by costs or short-term returns but rather should flow naturally to the most effective strategy for the changing context. The timing of increasing or decreasing the emphasis on innovation strategies is important to maintain the dynamic balance, and that timing, they argue, is primarily the responsibility of leadership.

The importance of implementing best management practices is widely understood. However, the authors argue, best practice alone is not enough. They use examples of three high-performing companies to show that those companies not only use standard best practices but also embrace internally developed idiosyncratic "signature processes" that reflect the history and values of the organization and executive team. Such "signature processes" -- a daily morning meeting of senior executives at the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, an easily reconfigured organizational structure at Nokia that involves modular teams and a "peer assist" program where business-unit heads help one another at BP Plc -- help drive high performance because they engender passion and energy within an organization. The mechanisms by which signature processes develop differ from those associated with best-practice ideas, however. The latter are often adapted from shared knowledge originating outside the company, whereas signature processes start with the values that internal executives champion.

The authors' research suggests that a variety of traps that forestall innovation can be avoided by, paradoxically, placing boundaries on innovation activity. In an environment without boundaries, say the authors, there is no context for shared interpretation or common expectations. Boundaries, on the other hand, act not as constraints but as aids to defining innovation needs and producing useful outputs that business units can exploit. Smartly placed constraints actually act as enablers of innovation by making it more palatable and execution friendly and giving it traction in the competition for corporate attention and resources. Drawing on their research, the authors offer several scenarios of "boundaries in use." They describe how Shell makes the radical legitimate by making it thematically relevant to core business, how Nokia restricts its innovation efforts to business-unit strategies and environmental turbulence, how Air Products focuses on ideas that leverage operational capabilities, how Siemens focuses on innovation potential that crosses products and businesses, and how IDEO's work with Texas Health Resources reframes the customer experience to anchor solutions in new ways.

Some techniques seem to drive new product development better than others.

Measuring learning instead of short-term results is key.

Markets develop according to the specific paths by which innovations in a given field occur.

Consumer-centered product design is an emerging best practice in many industries, particularly those characterized by practical products that hold no emotional appeal; or in which competition is based on increasingly less profitable attempts to cut cost or improve performance; or in which once distinctive products are becoming commoditized; or in which there is little room left for product innovation. Among the best practitioners, design is understood to be a core activity conferring competitive advantage by bringing to light the emotional meaning products and services have, or could have, for consumers and extracting the high value of such emotional connections. The authors discuss how companies such as Master Lock, Procter & ; Gamble, BMW and Cambridge SoundWorks have employed design research -- including the use of multidisciplinary teams and a variety of ethnographic and psychophysiological techniques -- to build organizationwide identification with the customers' needs and aspirations, keeping everyone's eyes on the same prize.

The author argues that the dominant challenge for the innovative firm may not be to command marketplace premiums for its innovation, but to strategically identify and opportunistically exploit subsidies for that innovation. For example, Microsoft's final stage of Windows 95 development was effectively subsidized to the tune of $900 million when the company drew upon a highly valuable technical population to test and help improve the quality of its new operating system. An innovation subsidy is the deliberate contributionof a business resource -- money, time, information, expertise, personnel or equipment -- in support of the development of a novel offering with no explicit expectation of a financial return. It is not, however, an outright donation or favor but rather the cost-effective bartering of resources by individuals and institutions that amounts to a gray-market mechanism for mitigating risk. (The article offers other subsidy scenarios referring to Gillette, 3M, IBM. Goldman Sachs and Citigroup.) The core differences in perceived and real risk among economic entities represent the richest source of ideas for opportunistic innovation subsidies. Such scenarios are clearly not merely about money, but about creating and managing relationships that tap the resources of a company's savviest customers. In the management of innovation risk, social capital can be as valuable as financial capital. Seeking out the innovation subsidy challenges firms to rethink the underlying economic relationships between their customers and suppliers.

A robust economy isn’t as far out of reach as some may think.