Leadership

An implicit assumption of the "war for talent" perspective is that departing workers are lost to competitors. Yet employees also leave to join "cooperators," such as customer companies, suppliers and partners, and such movement can facilitate the creation and strengthening of business relationships with those organizations. Another important factor is whether the departing employees possess generic or valuable company-specific knowledge. Managers should consider these two criteria -- the destination and knowledge of departing employees -- when determining how best to handle worker turnover. There are four different scenarios. In the first, employees with knowledge that is generic or of low strategic importance leave to join competitors. This type of turnover can hamper the productive capacity of an organization while increasing that of its competitors. Here the authors recommend the use of defensive maneuvers (such as improving employee benefits), which are designed to retain existing workers. In the second scenario, employees possessing knowledge that has low strategic importance depart to join cooperators. This type of turnover leads to administrative and human-capital costs that must be weighed against the possible social-capital benefits -- the new business opportunities that can be generated by ex-employees in their new jobs. The recommendation is for companies to adopt relational actions, in which they take active steps to maintain positive relationships with former employees, such as through the formation of alumni programs. The third scenario -- employees with strategically important, company-specific knowledge resign to take jobs with competitors -- is potentially the most damaging form of turnover. Consequently, companies might best be served by emphasizing retaliatory actions (such as the threat of lawsuits to enforce noncompete clauses in employment contracts) in addition to defensive maneuvers targeted toward the retention of specific employees who are crucial contributors. In the fourth and final scenario, employees with strategically important, company-specific knowledge leave to work for cooperators. This type of turnover presents interesting challenges. Because the loss of key employees incurs high administrative and human-capital costs, companies have a strong incentive to adopt defensive strategies to reduce such turnover. But the movement of key employees to cooperators can also lead to substantial opportunities for businesses to expand their social capital with important clients and suppliers. Therefore, when defensive maneuvers fail, a company should consider adopting a relational approach, maintaining positive relationships with departing key employees as they make the transition into their new jobs at cooperators.

Companies with connections to a nation’s government may be less productive.

What's behind every industry-shaking innovation? Countless, but crucial, "mini-innovations," as Joe Fox calls them. Along with his brother, Avi, Fox has founded two companies -- in entirely different industries -- that aimed to challenge the traditional business models. But in an interview with MIT Sloan Management Review, Fox explains that these large-scale innovations don't dawn on him all at once. Instead they arrive in fragments, some of which are conceived by his management team of original thinkers. The Fox brothers set the group to work after they've spotted a broader opportunity, which happens when they aren't looking for one. Their first business, an online brokerage called Web Street, grew out of their own experience trading equities. And they constructed the framework for BuySide Realty, an online real estate brokerage -- which they currently operate, along with a subsidiary called Iggys House -- when prowling around for a vacation home. After the initial inkling, Fox's market research consists not only of asking potential customers, but also of actually paying attention to their answers. What he's looking for is not their opinion of whether an idea can possibly be executed; he just wants to know if they would pay for such a service, assuming he could bring it into existence. Not that he's had an easy time bringing a notion to fruition. He's never been able to strike a deal with any institutional investors, although Web Street did successfully go public during the dot-com boom in 1999. He had hoped to repeat that feat with his current venture last year, but opted to wait for Wall Street's appetite to improve. In the meantime, Fox is counting on a steady supply of "mini-innovations" to keep the business ahead -- by a half-step, at least -- of its megacompetitors. Can he do it? Clearly, he thinks he knows how.

Initiatives to build and maintain trust with various stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and investors, have risen to the top of the executive agenda at many organizations. But the problem is that most companies don't really understand how to manage stakeholder trust effectively. In fact, the authors' research suggests that many of the trust-building initiatives and approaches that organizations invest in may be of questionable value. Others might actually be counterproductive. One of the reasons managing stakeholder trust is difficult is because there are many different stakeholder groups, each with its own particular needs and perspective. That is, trust is multidimensional, and it's not obvious which dimension executives need to focus on when dealing with any particular constituency. What, for example, is more important for building trust with employees and customers: a reputation for kind-hearted benevolence or for fair-minded integrity? To answer such questions, the authors conducted a study of stakeholder trust in four different organizations. The research analyzed the relevance (if any) of various factors: benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency and value congruence. In essence, the study asked what matters -- and to whom. Some of the results were unexpected, and a few were even counterintuitive, leading to the following key insights: Transparency is overrated; integrity is not enough; the right kind of competence matters; building trust with one group can destroy it with another; and value congruence matters across the board. The new framework challenges some existing beliefs and sheds light on a number of areas that companies would be wise not to ignore. Indeed, as the authors illustrate, fundamental misunderstandings about stakeholder trust have tripped up a number of corporations, including Coca-Cola, Google, Apple, Delta Air Lines, Mattel and Sprint. In the future, a deeper knowledge of stakeholder trust will help businesses become more adept at managing stakeholder trust so that they can reap the numerous benefits, including improved cooperation with suppliers, increased motivation and productivity among employees, enhanced loyalty from customers and higher levels of support from investors.

Despite the general understanding that leaders learn from experience, only a few organizations, such as Toyota, Boeing and General Electric, have truly taken it to heart by putting programs into place specifically to take advantage of experiential learning. Most companies stay within a narrow comfort zone. They certainly encourage aspiring and emerging leaders to "get experience," to take on "stretch" assignments and to take risks. But they provide precious little guidance on how to learn from experience -- how to mine it for insight about leading and adapting to change over the course of one's life. Organizations generally don't look outside their industry, or business itself, for new approaches. Instead, a banking model of learning predominates -- a semi-industrial process in which cost per unit is the key performance measure and knowledge is something deposited in aspiring leaders' heads for later use. That is unfortunate, because organizations are missing the opportunity to develop leaders by integrating their life and work experiences, especially those experiences the authors call "crucibles." Crucible experiences can be thought of as a kind of superconcentrated form of leadership development. Surprisingly, the best examples of organizations that deliberately employ such alchemy do not come from the business world. The authors draw on lessons from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, better known as the Mormons, and the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club to develop four lessons for helping to develop managers. First, both the Mormons and the Hells Angels demonstrate how it is possible to craft or convert core activities to serve as practice fields for leaders. Second, they engage in elaborate preparation before sending would-be leaders out into the field. Third, they provide a supporting infrastructure while members are in the midst of a crucible. Finally, they recognize the need for renewal in individuals and the organization.

Scholars of various kinds long have documented the great degree to which people are influenced by similar others. Indeed, the opinions, experiences and behaviors of friends, neighbors and coworkers can provide an invaluable gold mine of persuasive resources. But even savvy executives can fail to appreciate the full power of peer influence -- or they might neglect to anticipate its unintended consequences. Consider, for example, managers who are responsible for shaping or enforcing policy within an organization. They will frequently call attention to a problem behavior, such as supply room theft, by depicting it as regrettably frequent. Although such admonitions might be well-intentioned, the communicators have missed something critically important: Within the lament of "Look at all the people who are doing this undesirable thing" lurks the powerful and undercutting disclosure "Look at all the people who are doing it." And in trying to alert people to the growing occurrence of a problem -- which could be anything from expense account padding to safety violations -- managers can inadvertently make it worse. After the Internal Revenue Service announced that it was going to strengthen the penalties for tax evasion because so many citizens were cheating on their returns, tax fraud actually increased in the following year. But that's not the only type of mistake that managers regularly make. Indeed, a more subtle problem occurs when they fail to recognize how peer influence is affecting their own decisions. Such situations can be particularly dangerous, leading people to do exactly what they shouldn't, all because they inadvertently have listened to the wrong voices. Thus, when trying to solve a problem, managers should resist the tendency (and the conventional wisdom) to start by casting the widest net possible and then later discounting information that isn't relevant. The potential pitfall of that approach is that it inserts the filtering process too late, after any irrelevant data might have already had a subconscious impact on a person's decision making.

Why do some subsidiaries become isolated — and does it matter?

Many executives speak about corporate reputation and brand as if they are one and the same. They are not, and confusing the two can be costly -- a lesson which companies like Nike Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. have learned the hard way. Focusing on reputation at the expense of brand can lead to product offerings that languish in the market. However, concentrating on brand and neglecting reputation can be equally dangerous, resulting in a lower stock price, difficulties in attracting top talent and even product boycotts. Brand is a "customercentric" concept that focuses on what a product, service or company has promised to its customers and what that commitment means to them. Reputation is a "companycentric" concept that focuses on the credibility and respect that an organization has among a broad set of constituencies, including employees, investors, regulators, journalists and local communities -- as well as customers. In other words, brand is about relevancy and differentiation (with respect to the customer), and reputation is about legitimacy of the organization (with respect to a wide range of stakeholder groups, including but not limited to customers). For most companies, even an outstanding reputation almost never comprises any unique characteristics that an organization can own and be known for. In short, reputation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for excellence because companies also need strong brands, which are characterized by high customer loyalty, pricing power and the ability to drive growth. Ultimately what drives customer preference and revenue is the ability of a company to create relevant products, services and brands and communicate and deliver them in a way that customers want to buy. Thus, executives need to do more than just keep their company's reputation on track. They need to differentiate their offerings in ways that win the hearts, minds and wallets of customers, and what helps make a company and its products special and preferred is its brand, not its reputation.

Observers are often amazed when executives with impressive track records are mysteriously transformed into corrupt and tyrannical monsters once they become chief executive officers. In truth, these executives often had serious character flaws that were either hidden or ignored for years. Corporate boards and search committees are not likely to detect personality problems of promising CEO candidates simply by examining their resumes or by conducting standard job interviews. This raises the question of how corporate boards or CEO search committees can penetrate the facade of an upwardly mobile executive who is, in reality, a wolf in sheep's clothing. What danger signals do these individuals exhibit and what measures can be taken to reduce the likelihood of hiring a dysfunctional CEO? The author identifies eight potential danger signals including: an obsession with acquiring prestige, power, and wealth; a proclivity for developing grandiose strategies with little thought toward their implementation; and a fondness for a data-driven management style that overshadows or ignores a broader vision. Even sterling CEOs occasionally exhibit one or more of the danger signals described here. Potentially bad CEOs, however, usually possess several of these characteristics, and they exhibit them repeatedly. There is no ideal method for selecting a CEO, and there may be no executive position that provides a true test of a person's fitness to assume the top job, but there are several ways that a company can limit its risks when deciding on a CEO. Boards are usually cautious when looking at CEO candidates from outside the organization. They are more likely to be lulled into a sense of complacency, however, when considering an internal candidate. Some suggestions for screening prospective CEOs include disregarding the time-tested rule that past success is a predictor of future success, performing a thorough background check that focuses on a candidate's integrity and interpersonal skills and using experience-based interviews to test CEO finalists

How are companies approaching intellectual property strategy, and what are successful strategies for managing IP? To explore such questions, the author and his research team conducted a detailed survey of senior IP executives at 34 companies. The survey findings indicate that IP has become an area of focus for the executive committee and the board at many companies. What's more, the study found that top executives' involvement in IP strategy was correlated with better IP performance. Analysis of the survey data suggests another intriguing point: Some companies are now using an approach to IP strategy that the author calls "full-fledged IP protection." This "full-fledged IP protection" strategy includes seeking technical and nontechnical IP protection for even minor inventions, in an attempt to "pack" technology spaces with IP claims. This practice differs from a classic IP strategy of using IP to support core research and development. At least in some industries, this change in IP use may, the author suggests, be causing the nature of IP competition to shift from the world of "real" products to that of "potential" products. The study also found that, in the companies surveyed, IP-related tasks often entail cooperation among staff from different functional areas within a company, such as product designers and patent and trademark attorneys. Having clear-cut rules about IP at the functional level was associated with better IP performance in the companies surveyed, as was having corporate management devote time to listening to the company's most senior IP officers. On the other hand, failure to sell or license out IP when circumstances facilitated or necessitated such a trade was associated with significantly lower IP performance. In addition to the survey data, the author conducted interviews with senior executives from two of the participating companies: Lars Rebien Sorensen, the CEO of Novo Nordisk A/S, a healthcare company with a specialty in diabetes care; and Dr. Gottlieb Keller, a member of the corporate executive committee of the healthcare company F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd. In these interviews, Sorensen and Keller discussed the role of corporate leaders in IP strategy at their respective companies.